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Abstract. African ﬁnancial deepening is beset by a high rate of loan
defaults, which encourages banks to hold liquid assets instead of lending.
We put forward a novel theoretical model that captures the salient features
of African credit markets which shows that equilibrium with high loan
defaults and low lending can arise when contract enforcement institutions
are weak, investment opportunities are relatively scarce and information
imperfections abound. We provide evidence using a panel of 110 banks
from 29 African countries which corroborates our theoretical predictions.
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Sub-Saharan Africa remains one of the most ﬁnancially under-developed regions in the
world (Honohan and Beck 2007). Banks in Africa complain that there is a lack of
creditworthy borrowers while at the same time households and ﬁrms ﬁnd ﬁnance as a
major constraint in their activities. Recent research has shown that banks are deterred
from lending by a very high rate of loan defaults (Andrianova, Baltagi, Demetriades
and Fielding 2011, Demetriades and Fielding 2010). Understanding the determinants of
loan default rates in Africa seems, therefore, to hold the key to overcoming the obstacles
to ﬁnancial development in Africa. This paper makes a ﬁrst step in this direction by
providing both theory and evidence that shed new light on the factors behind high loan
defaults in Africa.
The starting point in our theoretical analysis is a model of bank lending with both
adverse selection and moral hazard, resulting from three diﬀerent types of borrowers:
honest, who always repay, dishonest, who always default, and opportunistic who can
choose to repay or default, depending on their expected payoﬀ. We assume that some
banks have access to an imperfect screening technology, which they can choose to use in
order to reduce adverse selection. We also assume that the output of the project is a form
of collateral, along the lines suggested by Rousseau (1998). In our case, however, the
fraction of the loan that is recoveredis determined by the degree of contract enforcement;
this is a key policy parameter which determines the type of equilibrium that obtains.
Such a setting captures the stylised facts of African credit markets rather well, resulting
in equilibria in which a high rate of loan defaults co-exists with banks’ choosing to lend
a fraction of their available resources.1
The key predictions of the theory are tested using a panel data set comprising 110
banks from 29 countries over the period 1998-2008. The empirical model, which is in-
1With few notable exceptions (Shubik 1973, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Rousseau 1998), loan defaults
in economic models are not an equilibrium phenomenon. For an excellent overview of the neglected role
of loan defaults in economics see Goodhart and Tsomokos (2011).
1formed by the theory, assumes that loan defaults are determined by bank characteristics,
such as age and size, and country-wide variables purporting to capture the quality of
contract enforcement and the availability of investment opportunities. The model is esti-
mated using the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) fractional logit regression which handles
fractional response variables based on quasi-likelihood methods. The results of these
estimations, which are consistent with our theoretical predictions, provide an empirical
handle on the relative inﬂuence of diﬀerent types of institutions and economic growth
on the default rate.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model and
derives its key predictions. Section 3 presents our empirical methods and data. Section
4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2 Theory
The starting point of our model is the “linear city”.2 There are three types of en-
trepreneurs (borrowers) who seek a loan of 1 monetary unit in order to undertake an
investment project: “honest” (in proportion α), “dishonest” (in proportion β) and “op-
portunistic” (in proportion γ with α + β + γ = 1). The honest type has an investment
project with rate of return R and this borrower always repays the loan. The opportunis-
tic type has the same investment project (with rate of return R) but can choose whether
to repay or default on his loan. The dishonest type has a project with rate of return 0,
this borrower will always default on his loan. The borrower’s type is private information,
the proportions α, β and γ are publicly known. All borrowers are uniformly distributed
on a unitary interval with distribution density 1.3 Applying for a loan is costly for a
borrower due to the transportation cost of t per unit of distance between the borrower
2The basic model is due to Hotelling (1929), but it is extended here along the lines which were
explored in Andrianova et al. (2011). The key diﬀerence between the current model and these two
previous papers is that it incorporates asymmetric information on both sides of the transaction.
3Geographical distance captures diﬀerence in individual tastes for the oﬀered loan contract.
2and the lender. Each borrower can apply for a loan to at most one lender.
Two lenders (banks) are available and located at the opposite ends of the interval
(bank A is at 0, bank B is at 1). The lenders compete for loan contracts: bank i sets
its loan interest rate ri to maximise its expected payoﬀ (i = {A,B}). Each lender has
suﬃcient funds to approve all loan applications.4 The banks diﬀer, in principle, in their
ability to gather and use information about individual borrower’s characteristics. Either
lender may be of one of the two types: “competent” type has a screening technology,
while “incompetent” has no ability to screen its borrowers. The lender is competent with
probability κ, otherwise with probability 1−κ it is incompetent; κ is common knowledge,
while the type of the lender is its private information. The screening technology, if
used, allows to obtain with probability σ a negative bundled signal about an individual
borrower who is either an opportunist with R-return project or a dishonest borrower with
a zero-return project. With probability 1−σ the screening fails to ﬁnd any information
about the borrower/project. With slight abuse of notation, κ-type bank chooses whether
to screen or not to screen its borrowers, and then whether to refuse (or not) applications
of borrowers with a negative screening signal. All lenders have access to a “safe” asset
which has the rate of return r0 (0 < r0 < R).
The loan contract enforcement is imperfect. Loan default when investment returned
R is remedied with probability λ by an imposition of a monetary penalty of 1 + R on
the defaulted borrower, of which the lender gets 1 + ri. Thus, the lender, if compen-
sated, is “made good” according to the contractual terms of his loan contract. The
diﬀerence between the borrower’s penalty and lender’s compensation is the enforcement
cost and is borne by the defaulted borrower. With probability 1 − λ, such default is
unenforceable (penalty and compensation are zero). When the borrower has zero return,
no enforcement of the loan contract is possible. Investment return is ex post observable
and non-falsiﬁable. All players are risk-neutral.
The timing of events is as follows:
4This assumption accords well with the ﬁndings of Honohan and Beck (2007).
3(1) Bank i (i = A,B) sets its lending rate ri.
(2) Each borrower chooses the bank in which to apply for a loan of 1 monetary unit.
(3) Facing the demand for loans, Di, κ-type bank i chooses whether to screen or not
all of its loan applications.
(4) Each bank chooses which applications to approve and which to decline.
(5) Honest and opportunistic borrowers with an approved loan invest.
(6) An honest borrower repays, a dishonest borrower defaults, an opportunistic bor-
rower chooses whether to repay or default.
(7) If any of its loans are defaulted on, the bank seeks compensation.
(8) Payoﬀs are realized.
Let q ∈ {0, 1} denote an opportunistic borrower’s decision to repay (q = 1) or default
(q = 0); let ξ ∈ {0, 1} be κ-type bank’s decision to screen (ξ = 1 is “screen’) and let
pj ∈ {0, 1} (where j = {κ, 1 − κ}) be j bank’s decision to approve all its applications
when there is no screening.
Note that if the proportion of dishonest borrowers is negligible, the competent type
of the bank will ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to use the screening technology. Also, the larger
the transportation cost the lower is the incentive of the dishonest borrower to apply for
a loan. In what follows we will therefore assume that the proportion of borrowers is
non-negligible and the transportation cost is not too high. Solving the model backwards
for pooling equilibria, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 There exist λ, ¯ λ, ¯ β and ¯ t, so that for β ≥ ¯ β and t ≤ ¯ t the unique
equilibrium of the game is:
(1) the low default equilibrium (LDE) with q = ξ = p1−κ = 1 if λ ≥ ¯ λ,
(2) the high default equilibrium (HDE) with q = 0, ξ = p1−κ = 1 if λ ≤ λ < ¯ λ,
4(3) the no lending equilibrium (NLE) with q = ξ = pκ = p1−κ = 0 if λ < λ.
Intuitively, NLE obtains when the contract enforcement is very weak. In such a situ-
ation, widespread default by opportunistic and dishonest borrowers makes lending un-
proﬁtable for any screening technology. LDE exists in the presence of a non-negligible
proportion of dishonest borrowers when the contract enforcement is suﬃciently good.
And in the intermediate range of the contract enforcement parameter values, HDE ob-
tains because the opportunistic borrowers have no incentive to repay (given relatively
weak enforcement) but the banks nevertheless ﬁnd it proﬁtable to screen and lend to all
those borrowers who do not appear to have a negative signal (given that enforcement is
not too weak and defaults are compensated often enough to make lending proﬁtable).
In this model, economic “growth” can be measured by the increase in (1−β) because
this proportion represents all borrowers who have the high return investment opportu-
nity. Additionally, in HDE the default probability is measured by (1−α)[1−κσ], which
is decreasing in α, κ and σ. It is then easy to see that with higher economic growth
the probability of default will fall as long as the increase in growth does not exclusively
beneﬁt opportunistic borrowers. In LDE, because opportunists do not default and conse-
quently the default probability is β(1−κσ), economic growth will unambiguously reduce
the default rate.
3 Methodology and Data
The ﬁrst aim of the empirical model is to provide a framework in which the main
predictions of the theory can be tested. Speciﬁcally, we aim to test whether (a) better
contract enforcement and (b) an improvement in borrower quality reduce the probability
of loan defaults. The second, equally important, aim of the empirical analysis is to shed
light on what kind of policies can be used to contain loan defaults in Africa. Below we
put forward a plausible empirical model that can address both aims.
It is reasonable to assume that the probability of loan default is a function of bank
5characteristics, including bank age and bank assets. We assume it could also depend
on contract enforcement and other governance indicators capturing the institutional as-
pects of African credit markets, particularly those encapsulating the degree of contract
enforcement. The model includes various interaction terms between the bank charac-
teristics and the governance indicators in order to examine the eﬀects of governance on
diﬀerent types of bank.
Formally, we assume that the proportion of loan defaults for bank i in country j at






where N is the number of years a bank has been in operation, GS is the government’s
share in the bank, LA is the logarithm of total assets (expressed in million US dollars),
RoL is rule of law, Corr is control of corruption, REG is regulation, and GY is the
growth rate of GDP. X is a vector of other controls that includes geographical dummies
and interaction terms while subscripts i, j and t stand for bank, country and year,
respectively.
If F is linear it can be estimated by OLS. However, there is no guarantee that the
predicted proportions from OLS will lie between 0 and 1. Also OLS implies a constant
marginal eﬀect of the regressor on the probability of loan default. This may not be
plausible, say for the eﬀect of a one year increase in the age of the bank, as it may
be diﬀerent for a young upstart bank versus an old and well established bank. Despite
these weaknesses, OLS remains a useful benchmark not least because the estimated
parameters are easy to interpret. We therefore present OLS estimates of the model
as the starting point in our empirical investigation. In all regressions we include year
dummies to account for time varying macro shocks or common factors that aﬀect all
banks in all of our regressions. We ﬁnd these time dummies statistically signiﬁcant.
As OLS does not account for the heterogeneity across banks, we also report results
using a Random Eﬀects (RE) estimator. Not accounting for such heterogeneity can
lead to biased standard errors for the OLS estimates, wrong t-statistics and misleading
6inference.5
Like OLS, the RE estimator ignores the fact that the dependent variable is a fraction.
We therefore apply the Papke and Wooldridge (1996) fractional logit regression which
handles fractional response variables based on quasi-likelihood methods. Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) propose modelling the conditional mean of the dependent variable
as a logistic function. This ensures that the predicted value of the dependent variable
lies in the interval (0, 1). It is also well deﬁned even if the dependent variable takes
the values 0 or 1 with positive probability (Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon 1984).
Maximizing the Bernoulli log-likelihood function yields the quasi-MLE (QMLE) which
is consistent and asymptotically normal Gourieroux et al. (1984). McCullagh and Nelder
(1989) propose the generalized linear model (GLM) approach to this problem. We apply
the Logit QMLE in Stata using the GLM command with the Bernoulli Binary family
function and the link function indicating the logistic distribution. To check robustness
we also report results using the complementary log-log link function. The latter, unlike
Logit, is asymmetric around zero and as such can account for skewness arising from a
large number of zeros or ones in the dataset.
The bank data are collectedfrom Bank Scope and consist of 110 banks in 29 countries
observed over the period 1998–2008. We measure the default rate as the ratio of impaired
loans to total loans. The governance indicators are from the World Bank Governance
Database. GDP data and exchange rates are from World Development Indicators.
Summary statistics and correlations can be found in Tables 1 and 2. The mean
default rate is just under 11.0 per cent and ranges from near 0 to 81 per cent. Bank
age varies from a young 3 to a mature 147 years old and has a mean of just under 37
years. The government share varies from 0 to 100 and has a mean of 7.9 per cent. All
the governance indicators we utilise have negative means and their standard deviation is
5Although Fixed Eﬀects estimation accounts for the possible correlation of the random bank eﬀects
with the regressors, it wipes out important variables of interest such as bank age and is therefore not
reported.
7below 1; not surprisingly these compare unfavourably with a worldwide mean of 0 and a
unit standard deviation. The mean growth rate, however, is a healthy 2.2 per cent per
annum, but varies considerably from −16.4 per cent to 25.4 per cent.
The default rate is negatively correlated with bank age, positively correlated with
government share and negatively correlated with the logarithm of assets. All these cor-
relations of the default rate with individual bank characteristics are plausible, suggesting
that as banks get bigger and older they acquire more information capital and are able
to better control loan defaults. Government ownership is positively associated with loan
defaults, indicating that politically determined priorities or indeed corruption result in
a greater proportion of impaired loans. The default rate is negatively correlated with
all the governance indicators, indicating that better governance results in lower loan de-
faults. Moreover, it is negatively correlated with the GDP growth rate, suggesting that
as economic opportunities improve, loan defaults decline. All these, although plausible,
are, however, unconditional correlations. The next section provides a more rigorous
empirical analysis of the determinants of loan defaults.
4 Empirical Results
The empirical models include interactions between GS and Corr on the one hand and
RoL and N on the other.6 Additional controls include a set of time dummies and a North
African dummy (which kicks in if a bank is located in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco
or Tunisia).7 We also report results by excluding the North African banks altogether.
6Other interactions were also attempted but were found insigniﬁcant and were, therefore, dropped.
7We also tried an ‘oﬀshore’ dummy for Mauritius and the Seychelles but this was insigniﬁcant and
therefore dropped.
8OLS and RE Results
Table 3 presents an initial set of empirical estimates using OLS and RE. Where there are
diﬀerences between OLS and RE, we attach more weight to the RE estimates because
the Breusch-Pagan test suggests that the random eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant.
In both OLS and RE estimates, the North Africa dummy is positive and highly
signiﬁcant, while bank age appears to have an inverse U-shape eﬀect on loan defaults
as the level term is positive and signiﬁcant while the squared term is negative and also
signiﬁcant. These estimates are consistent with a ‘learning-by-doing’ lending technology,
with the turning point being around 1.5 years old, which seems plausible. Logarithm of
assets enters with a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, albeit only at the 10% level in the
OLS estimates, suggesting that bigger is better when it comes to reducing loan defaults.
Government share is signiﬁcant at the 10% level according to the OLS estimates but
insigniﬁcant in the RE estimates. Its interaction with control of corruption is negative,
although signiﬁcant only in the OLS estimates, indicating that the eﬀects of government
ownership vary inversely with the degree of corruption. Rule of law is negative and
signiﬁcant (at the 1.0 per cent level in the RE estimates). Its eﬀects appear to be
tempered by bank age, as the interaction term between Rule of law and Bank age is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1.0 per cent level. In both sets of estimates Control of
corruption is negative and signiﬁcant while Regulatory quality is, surprisingly, positive
and highly signiﬁcant. Finally, Growth rate is negative but is only signiﬁcant in the OLS
regressions.
When we exclude banks located in North Africa the results remain qualitatively very
similar, although there are two exceptions. Logarithm of assets is no longer signiﬁcant
in the RE estimates, suggesting that within Sub-Saharan Africa, bigger banks are not
able to better prevent loan defaults. The other key diﬀerence is that Government share
is now positive and signiﬁcant in both the RE and OLS estimates. Thus, it appears
that government ownership of banks in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with more loan
defaults, although this eﬀect is tempered when control of corruption is positive (i.e.
9above the world mean).
GLM Results
Table 4 provides the GLM estimates of the same models, on which we attach more weight
than the OLS and RE estimates. It should be noted that because of the non-linearity
of the link function, the parameter estimates are not comparable to those presented in
Table 3. Furthermore, the coeﬃcients do not represent the marginal eﬀect of a variable.
Qualitatively speaking the results in Table 4 are similar to those presented in Table
3 being, in fact, somewhat closer to those obtained with OLS than RE. To start with,
the estimates for all countries suggest that Bank age has a positive eﬀect while Bank age
squared has a negative eﬀect that is signiﬁcant—both these eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the
1% level. Logarithm of assets has a negative eﬀect that is marginally signiﬁcant as was
the case with both OLS and RE. Government share enters with a negative coeﬃcient
that is, however, far from being signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This can be contrasted
with a positive coeﬃcient in Table 3, signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the OLS case. Both
Rule of law and Control of corruption have negative and signiﬁcant eﬀects, with the
level of signiﬁcance being 1% for both—a qualitatively similar result to that shown in
Table 3. The same is true of Regulatory quality that once again enters with a positive
coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The Growth rate has a negative eﬀect that
is highly signiﬁcant as was the case using OLS; in contrast the corresponding estimate
by RE is not signiﬁcant. The North Africa dummy is positive and highly signiﬁcant as
was the case with both OLS and RE. The interaction between Government share and
Control of corruption is now negative and highly signiﬁcant. The interaction between
Rule of law and Bank age remains positive and highly signiﬁcant.
The corresponding results using the complementary log-log link function are nearly
identical to those obtained with the Logistic, indicating robustness to any skewness.
Moreover, the time dummies are jointly signiﬁcant and the diagnostics are satisfactory.
The estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa are qualitatively similar to those for all coun-
10tries with three relatively minor exceptions. The ﬁrst is the somewhat lower coeﬃcients
on Bank age and Bank age squared (in absolute value), indicating perhaps somewhat
less rapid ‘learning by doing’. The second is the coeﬃcient of Logarithm of assets which
loses signiﬁcance and is about a third smaller in absolute terms. The third and ﬁnal
exception is that Government share remains insigniﬁcant, although it now has a positive
coeﬃcient.
The results presented in Table 4 conﬁrm that the (lack of) economic growth is one
of the most important causes of the high loan default rate, providing support to the
adverse selection hypothesis. Moreover, they suggest that Control of corruption and
Rule of law can help check the default rate, although their eﬀect diﬀers depending on a
bank’s age and ownership. Government owned banks stand to beneﬁt most when control
of corruption is above the world average while younger banks stand to beneﬁt most from
improvements in the rule of law.
The only surprising result is that Regulatory quality has a positive marginal eﬀect on
the default rate. This eﬀect is of course ceteris paribus. As we are controlling for Rule of
law and Corruption, and given the positive correlation between the three indicators, it
could be argued that marginal improvements in regulatory quality, if not accompanied
by improvements in Rule of law and Corruption, can only represent an increased burden
on doing business i.e. ‘red tape’.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is now well known that African ﬁnancial deepening is plagued by a high rate of
loan defaults, which deters banks from lending and encourages them to hold liquid
domestic or foreign assets instead (Andrianova et al. 2011, Demetriades and Fielding
2010). A better understanding of the underlying causes of loan defaults, therefore,
holds the key to addressing ﬁnancial under-development in Africa. To this end, we
have put forward a model of bank lending that captures some of the salient features of
11African credit markets, including the lack of collateral, weak contract enforcement and
severe information imperfections. In our model, loan defaults arise as an equilibrium
phenomenon, in contrast to nearly all previous theoretical literature on credit markets.
The incidence of loan defaults has been shown to depend inversely on the eﬀectiveness
of contract enforcement and the availability of investment opportunities.
It has been shown that weak contract enforcement can combine with lack of economic
opportunities and rising adverse selection to deter banks from lending altogether. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, when contract enforcement is reasonably good—albeit
imperfect—banks will choose to lend, even if their screening technologies are unable to
detect all dishonest borrowers, who will always default on their loans. We have also
shown that there exists an intermediate equilibrium with high loan defaults. In this
equilibrium both dishonest and opportunistic borrowers default on their loans. Banks,
nevertheless, ﬁnd it proﬁtable to lend. Thus, high loan defaults—a stylised fact of
African credit markets—can co-exist with banks continuing to lend. In this equilibrium,
which arguably is the most interesting one, the default probability has been shown to be
decreasing in the proportion of honest borrowers, the number of competent banks and
the quality of the screening technology.
Economic growth—measured by an increase in the proportion of borrowers who have
access to an investment opportunity—can reduce the default rate in both the Low and
High Default equilibria. In the latter, however, the reduction of the default rate will be
greater, the larger the increase in honest borrowers gaining access to the new investment
opportunity.
We have presented empirical evidence from a large number of African banks that
is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Speciﬁcally, we have shown that growth
is inversely related to the rate of loan defaults, as does the rule of law and control
of corruption. Bank age, which we consider a good proxy for a banks screening ability,
rapidly reduces the default rate, but only once a bank is no longer a ‘baby’. Government
banks in corrupt environments have been found to experience higher loan defaults than
12similar age private banks. On the other hand, when control of corruption is above the
world average, government ownership is found to reduce the default rate.
Our results have straightforward policy implications. Improved screening of borrow-
ers, which calls for the development of credit bureaus and better information sharing,
seems critical to reduce adverse selection. Better governance, especially better contract
enforcement and control of corruption, seems equally important in terms of deterring
moral hazard by opportunistic borrowers. Finally, although it does appear that govern-
ment banks have better information capital and can, in principle, reduce loan defaults,
government ownership appears to make matters worse in countries in which control of
corruption is below the world norm.
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14Appendix A: Theory proofs
The proof of the proposition sets out the payoﬀs of all players and then establishes the
conditions which deliver the stated pooling equilibria.
The expected payoﬀ of a borrower of each type from applying for a loan to bank
i = {A,B} is as follows:
U
α















i stands for the distance between the borrower of type {.} and bank i, while
x
{.}
B = 1 − x
{.}





ξ{(1 + ri)[α + γ(1 − σ)(q + λ(1 − q))] + (1 + r0)σ(γ + β)} +






p1−κ(1 + ri)[α + γ(q + λ(1 − q))] + (1 − p1−κ)(1 + r0)
i
where Di is the demand for bank i loan contracts.
LDE is deﬁned as an equilibrium with q∗ = 1, ξ∗ = 1 and p∗
1−κ = 1. For q∗ = 1, we




i (q = 1|ξ = 1,p1−κ = 1) ≥ U
γ
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The competent bank will choose ξ∗ = 1 when V κ
i (ξ = 1|q∗ = 1,p∗
1−κ) ≥ V κ
i (ξ = 0|q∗ =
1,p∗
1−κ), or equivalently when
β ≥ γ(ri − r0)/(1 + r0). (2)









15i.e. it is the sum of total demands per type of borrower. These latter ones are determined
by the marginal borrower of each type. Each type marginal borrower is indiﬀerent




















(1 − κσ) (5)
If the dishonest borrower located exactly in the middle of the interval between the two
banks has a non-negative payoﬀ, then every dishonest borrower will apply to the nearest
bank. This translates into
x
β
A = 1/2 when κσ ≥ 1 − t/2. (6)







[α + γ(1 − κσ)](rA − rB) (7)
Substituting this into competent bank’s payoﬀ and solving the ﬁrst order condition for
a symmetric solution (rA = rB), it can be checked that
1 + r
∗




α + γ(1 − κσ)
−
σ(γ + β)(1+ r0)
α + γ(1 − σ)
(8)
To ensure that all opportunistic borrowers apply for a loan (i.e. that the marginal
opportunistic borrower is located in the middle of the interval), it is suﬃcient to assume
that t ≤ σ(1 − α)(1 + r0). Note that when the participation constraint of opportunistic
marginal borrower is staisﬁed, so will be the PC of the honest borrower (because the
expected payoﬀ of an honest borrower in LDE is higher than that of an opportunistic
borrower located at the same point). The stricter of the two conditions on t will ensure
that borrowers of every type apply.
To solve for HDE with q∗ = 0, ξ = 1 and p1−κ = 1, repeat the steps of the so-
lution for LDE. Opportunistic borrowers chose q∗ = 0 when the reverse of (1) holds.
16The competent type of bank prefers to screen all its loan applications if (2), as be-
fore. Additionally, in this case, given that q∗ = 0, the competent bank prefers screening
and lending to those with untainted record over not screening and not lending to any
borrower: V κ
i (ξ∗ = 1|q∗ = 0) ≥ V κ
i (ξ∗ = 0,pκ = 0|q∗ = 0), which obtains when
λ ≥
(1 − σ(1 − α))(1 + r0)





Since opportunistic borrowers do not repay their loans in HDE, their expected payoﬀ
no longer depends on ri and therefore the marginal borrowers of each type in HDE are
given by (4), (6) and
x
γ
A = 1/2 when (1 − κσ)(R − rA) ≥ t/2 (10)
Solving for rA from the ﬁrst order condition of the expected payoﬀ maximisation of the
competent bank and assuming a symmetric solution, the equilibrium rate in HDE is
1 + r
∗






σ(1 − α)(1 + r0)
α + γλ(1 − σ)
(11)
To complete the proposition, NLE obtains when the competent bank ﬁnds it more
proﬁtable to invest the loanable funds into the safe asset rather than to make loans:
V κ
i (ξ∗ = 1|q∗ = 0) < V κ
i (ξ∗ = 0,pκ = 0|q∗ = 0), which is the reverse of (9).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (110 banks from 29 countries)
Variable name Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Observations Deviation
Default rate 519 0.1086 0.1311 0.0001 0.8087
Bank age 519 36.7861 32.7211 3 147
Government share 519 7.8566 20.0841 0 100
Logarithm of assets 519 6.5584 2.8756 –1.5539 20.2198
Control of corruption 519 –0.4659 0.6464 –1.5464 1.0708
Regulatory quality 519 –0.4203 0.7153 –2.3694 0.9536
Rule of law 519 –0.5330 0.6654 –1.7216 0.8956
Growth rate 519 0.0220 0.0484 –0.1644 0.2541
Table 2: Correlation Matrix
Default Bank age Government Logarithm Control of Regulatory Rule
rate share of assets corruption quality of law
Bank age –0.0452
Government share 0.2134 –0.0249
Logarithm of assets –0.1142 0.3149 –0.0089
Control of corruption –0.1652 0.0222 0.0662 –0.0216
Regulatory quality –0.0353 0.0072 0.0585 –0.2151 0.8195
Rule of law –0.1001 0.0074 0.1217 –0.0691 0.9266 0.8546
Growth rate –0.0621 –0.1701 0.0867 –0.2431 0.2497 0.4178 0.3315
18Table 3: OLS and Random Eﬀects (RE) regressions of the default rate
All Countries Sub-Saharan Africa
Method of Estimation Method of Estimation
Regressor OLS RE OLS RE
Bank age 0.1108** 0.2292** 0.0648 0.1849**
(0.0484) (0.1081) (0.0459) (0.0910)
Bank age squared –0.0991*** –0.1771** –0.0453 –0.1278**
(0.0333) (0.0767) (0.0307) (0.0640)
Logarithm of assets –0.0025* –0.0049** –0.0024* –0.0033
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0022)
Government share 0.0455* 0.0800 0.0993*** 0.1234***
(0.0271) (0.0510) (0.0299) (0.0462)
Rule of law –0.0480** –0.0642*** –0.0340* –0.0775**
(0.0233) (0.0256) (0.0202) (0.0331)
Control of corruption –0.0795*** –0.0406** –0.0999*** –0.0579**
(0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0247)
Regulatory quality 0.0824*** 0.0606*** 0.0815*** 0.0738***
(0.0185) (0.0228) (0.0182) (0.0253)
Growth rate –0.4096*** –0.7156 –0.4585*** –0.0578
(0.1026) (0.0845) (0.1089) (0.0853)
North Africa 0.1149*** 0.1055***
(0.0171) (0.0412)
Constant 0.0954*** 0.0954*** 0.0442** 0.0077
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0267)
Interaction terms
Government share x –0.2635*** –0.1355 –0.0379*** –0.2572***
control of corruption (0.0721) (0.0859) (0.0833) (0.0969)
Rule of law x bank age 0.0412*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Summary Statistics and Diagnostics
No. of obs 519 519 442 442
No. of banks 110 110 95 95
Joint signiﬁcance
of time dummies 3.43 33.02 3.40 29.41
[p-value] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Rho (Fraction of
variance due to RE 0.7083 0.6103
Breusch-Pagan LM test for RE 403.75 328.09
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: All regressions include a full set of time dummies
19Table 4: GLM regressions of the default rate
All Countries Sub-Saharan Africa
Bernoulli Binary Family Bernoulli Binary Family
Link Function Link Function
Regressor Logistic Log Log Logistic Log Log
Bank age 1.995*** 1.943*** 1.589** 1.562**
(0.632) (0.599) (0.710) (0.678)
Bank age squared –1.804*** –1.755*** –1.006** –1.001**
(0.466) (0.445) (0.469) (0.450)
Logarithm of assets –0.039* –0.037* –0.029 –0.026
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Government share –0.143 –0.272 0.551 0.555
(0.507) (0.505) (0.471) (0.438)
Rule of law –0.651*** –0.651*** –0.654** –0.715***
(0.254) (0.239) (0.294) (0.290)
Control of corruption –0.917*** –0.833*** –1.283*** –1.145***
(0.192) (0.178) (0.234) (0.218)
Regulatory quality 0.885*** 0.844*** 0.945*** 0.910***
(0.185) (0.178) (0.195) (0.190)
Growth rate –3.638*** –3.353*** –3.926*** –3.321***
(1.124) (1.062) (1.221) (1.112)
North Africa 1.380*** 1.283***
(0.161) (0.150)
Constant –3.426*** –3.414*** –3.886*** –3.933***
(0.275) (0.264) (0.365) (0.357)
Interaction terms
Government share x -2.634*** –2.536*** –3.317*** –2.818***
control of corruption (0.945) (0.953) (0.849) (0.753)
Rule of law x bank age 0.624*** 0.595*** 1.077*** 0.996***
(0.235) (0.226) (0.284) (0.278)
Summary Statistics and Diagnostics
No. of obs 519 519 442 442
No. of banks 110 110 95 95
Joint signiﬁcance
of time dummies 25.14 24.01 29.09 29.30
[p-value] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Log pseudolikelihood –125.27 –125.34 –97.60 –97.61
AIC 0.556 0.556 0.523 0.523
BIC –3077.9 –3077.8 –2546.7 –2546.7
Note: All regressions include a full set of time dummies.
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